多空激辯：穩定幣龍頭CRCL值不值得買？高增長財報為何帶不動股價？

Original / Odaily (@OdailyChina)

Author / Ding Dang (@XiaMiPP)

Recently, the Chinese community on X has sparked intense discussions around "Is Circle (NYSE: CRCL) worth buying?", with public opinion clearly divided into two major camps. One side views it as a valuable asset with significant institutional advantages in the stablecoin track, while the other frequently questions the fragility of its profit model and potential cyclical risks. The clash of viewpoints reflects the market's vastly different judgment logics and expectation levels regarding innovative projects.

Based on extensive public discussions and rational analysis within the community, Odaily has compiled the core arguments and reasoning paths of both sides, attempting to present readers with the deeper structural disagreements behind the controversy, beyond emotions and positions.

Background Summary

Since its listing on the New York Stock Exchange on June 5, 2025, Circle (NYSE: CRCL) has experienced a complete, typical price curve of a "narrative-driven asset": from an IPO price of $64, it surged to a phase high of $298.9 in a short time, then gradually declined, returning near its IPO price around November 20, 2025, touching a low of $64.9, and recently rebounding to around $83.9.

On November 12, 2025, CRCL released its first full quarterly report (Q3) post-IPO: total revenue of $740 million, a year-on-year increase of 66%; net profit of $214 million, EPS $0.64, significantly exceeding market expectations. The most critical driving factors were the surge in USDC circulation from $35.5 billion in the same period last year to $73.7 billion (+108%), and the increase in reserve asset yields in a high-interest-rate environment.

However, the stock price fell 11.4% on the first day after the earnings release and accumulated a 20% drop over the week. Key pain points included high distribution fees ($448 million, 60% of revenue), operating expenses eroding profits, excessively high proportion of non-recurring income (71% from changes in fair value of investments), and selling pressure from the lock-up expiration. According to SEC filings, the IPO lock-up period ended after the Q3 earnings report, with a potentially large number of shares becoming eligible for sale starting November 14.

Regarding these facts and the diverging opinions, Odaily has compiled the views of @0xNing0x, Jiang Zhuor, @Phyrex_Ni, @BTCdayu, @qinbafrank, and others for readers' comparative analysis.

1. Is the Profit Model Sustainable: Is CRCL a Bank or Financial Infrastructure?

Jiang Zhuor believes that the essence of CRCL's profit source is "earning the spread": users exchange money for USDC, Circle allocates these funds to low-risk assets like U.S. Treasuries, earns interest income, and then deducts operating costs and channel profit-sharing.

However, the problem lies in CRCL's profit distribution structure being extremely unfavorable to itself. According to the agreement, approximately 61% of the profits must be shared with Coinbase, and Coinbase also holds 22% of the USDC share, with 100% of the profits from that portion going to itself. In other words, the actual proportion of profits CRCL can truly retain is very low.

More critically, in a rate-cutting cycle, the fragility of this "spread-earning" model will be infinitely magnified. When U.S. Treasury yields fall to around 2% long-term, and operating costs approach 1%, after deducting channel profit-sharing, CRCL might even enter a loss-making state.

He believes that CRCL's current profit structure does not stem from commercial efficiency but from the regulatory arrangement of the policy "prohibiting issuers from directly paying Treasury interest to users." This model is essentially a parasitic structure. Once policies relax, or competitors indirectly bypass restrictions for profit-sharing through rewards, rebates, staking, etc., CRCL's profit margins could be directly hollowed out.

@0xNing0x provided a more detailed breakdown of CRCL's profit structure. CRCL's net profit is highly correlated with three core variables: USDC issuance scale, the Federal Reserve's benchmark rate, and distribution channel costs.

Based on historical financial data, the elasticity coefficients of these three factors on profit are not the same: the scale factor's elasticity is about 2.1, the interest rate factor about 1.9, and the channel cost factor about 1.3. This means changes in USDC scale have the greatest impact on profit. According to calculations, every $10 billion increase in USDC scale theoretically brings about $114 million in incremental profit, corresponding to an approximately 21% profit elasticity amplification effect.

Both of them believe that CRCL resembles a bank dressed in tech clothing, but the market prices it using a tech stock or even a "tech + bank" hybrid valuation logic, which is a clear mismatch, and the stock price will eventually revert to reality.

In contrast, BTCdayu and qinbafrank have a different understanding. They do not agree with the analogy "CRCL is a bank." They believe that simply understanding CRCL as a spread-earning bank is a very superficial observation.

In their view, CRCL is running a typical "lose money first, monopolize later" business. Sharing out profits is not forced but a strategic choice. The essence is not to make short-term profits but to exchange for irreversible accumulation of scale, network effects, and user mindshare.

They analogize to companies like Amazon, Pinduoduo, and JD.com: these companies all experienced years of losses, and were even considered to have flawed business models, but later proved those losses were the cost of "buying the market," not structural defects. If you measure these companies by their current profits, you can only conclude they "should have gone bankrupt long ago."

In their view, the stablecoin market is a highly likely "winner-takes-all" track. Once USDC establishes irreversible advantages in compliance and scale, the seemingly heavy profit-sharing costs today will transform into pricing power in the future. The state of "begging others to use it" will become "others begging to integrate."

2. Will the Rate-Cutting Cycle Break the Profit Model?

Jiang Zhuor and some cautious voices are very clear: interest rates are CRCL's lifeline.

Since Circle's revenue is highly dependent on U.S. Treasury yields, as long as the interest rate trend is downward, CRCL's revenue ceiling will be systematically compressed. Even if USDC scale grows, in their view, it is difficult to fully offset the negative impact brought by the interest rate cycle.

They are more inclined to view CRCL as a "financial spread asset" highly sensitive to macro interest rates, rather than a tech company with endogenous growth power.

The judgment of BTCdayu and qinbafrank is: Interest rates are not the key variable; scale is.

They believe rate cuts are gradual, not a one-time collapse. Simultaneously, the true explosive period for stablecoins has not yet arrived. Once stablecoin legislation is enacted, and more traditional financial institutions and corporate users start using stablecoins compliantly, USDC's issuance scale could potentially grow from the current sub-trillion dollar level to the $2-3 trillion range, or even higher, within a few years.

They are not fixated on fine details like "whether next year's rate is 3% or 2.5%." In their view, as long as the growth rate of issuance scale far exceeds the magnitude of the rate decline, the overall revenue scale is still expanding.

They tend to believe that the current market overly focuses on the explicit variable "interest rate" but underestimates the more hidden yet more powerful force of "compliance-driven scale migration."

More importantly, the profit-sharing agreement with Coinbase is a "result of commercial negotiation," not eternally immutable. When CRCL's market position shifts from "begging for distribution" to "being relied upon," bargaining power will naturally tilt.

3. The Stablecoin War: Will CRCL Be Crushed by Giants?

Jiang Zhuor's judgment on the competitive landscape is pessimistic.

He believes that once traditional financial giants like JPMorgan Chase fully enter the fray, a company of CRCL's size will find it difficult to compete in terms of credit backing, channel resources, and regulatory influence. More importantly, giants are fully capable of using subsidies, profit concessions, or even operating at a loss to seize market share.

In his view, CRCL does not possess the censorship-resistant attributes of USDT nor irreplaceability. Once stablecoins from traditional institutions begin to roll out, CRCL might become marginalized.

@BTCdayu emphasizes that the essence of stablecoin competition is a war for user mindshare. USDC has already formed an invisible moat through compliance, licenses, partnerships, and long-term accumulation. In the future, most funds may still flow to the safest and most recognized USDC. CRCL's strategic alliances with Coinbase, BlackRock, JPMorgan, etc., and its upcoming first U.S. stablecoin bank charter, further consolidate its market position.

BTCdayu and qinbafrank emphasize that this is a misjudgment of stablecoin competition logic.

They believe stablecoins are not merely financial products but typical "network products." The real moat is not capital strength but user mindshare, security consensus, and migration costs.

They point out that JPMorgan is already working on stablecoin-like products, but these are more like "deposit tokens" for internal institutional circulation, belonging to a closed system, resembling corporate Q coins rather than the open-network USDC.

In their view, big bank stablecoins serve their own business systems more than building a globally open clearing network. What truly competes with USDC is an equally open, compliant, and composable stablecoin system, not a bank's own closed assets.

4. Compliance: A Moat or an Invisible Risk?

Jiang Zhuor believes that CRCL's profit model is built on institutional advantages brought by regulatory vacuums. Once rules change, advantages may turn into shackles.

The judgment of BTCdayu and qinbafrank is completely opposite.

They believe the stablecoin path will inevitably move towards a stage of "being co-opted." Whoever completes compliance first can become part of national-level infrastructure.

In their logic, compliance is a clearing mechanism, not a binding mechanism. As gray areas are gradually squeezed, it actually benefits players like USDC that have already deeply positioned themselves for compliance.

5. Short-Term Trading Level: Lock-up Expiration, Selling Pressure, and Timing

Phyrex_Ni's perspective is more focused on the trading level.

His core concern is not long-term logic but short-term supply-demand structure. He particularly notes that CRCL has entered a large-scale lock-up expiration window, with lock-up periods for executives, founders, employees, and early investors ending successively.

He does not believe these shares will necessarily be sold off in a concentrated manner, but he considers this a typical stage of "sudden increase in supply," creating additional downward pressure on the stock price.

His stance is very clear: the current price is no longer expensive, but he is unwilling to bear the "time cost + opportunity cost," preferring to wait for uncertainties to be released before making a judgment.

6. Practical Payment Obstacles: Structural Limitations of USDC in the U.S.

Phyrex_Ni raised a rarely discussed but, in his opinion, crucial issue: tax attributes.

He points out that under the U.S. tax code, USDC is not treated as "cash" but as an "asset." This means every USDC payment may trigger capital gains tax calculation obligations.

This inherently makes it difficult for USDC to enter U.S. retail payment scenarios. Even if the regulatory path is clear, as long as the tax code remains unchanged, large-scale C2C payments are almost impossible to achieve.

In his view, this limits USDC's payment ceiling in the U.S. domestic market, making it more likely to remain in B2B, cross-border clearing, and financial back-end applications, rather than becoming true "digital cash."

7. Long-Term Potential: A Cyclical Play or a Structural Opportunity?

qinbafrank is a typical long-term bull.

His logic is not complicated: stablecoins are a massive track, far from reaching its ceiling. Growing from the current few trillion dollars to tens of trillions in the future is not a fantasy.

He believes that in a market with tenfold growth potential, leading and quasi-leading companies naturally enjoy a premium. CRCL may not be the absolute number one, but it is the most compliant and most easily accepted by institutional systems.

From his perspective, what the market should truly do is not obsess over short-term fluctuations but identify which companies in such a structural track possess the qualifications to participate in the "final round of centralization红利."

Conclusion

The cheaper the price, the more seriously one should study it, not dismiss it more easily. Currently, bears see short-term structural risks: excessively high distribution costs, path dependence on interest rates, supply pressure from lock-up expirations, and potential impacts from tax system and regulatory marginal changes; bulls are betting on structural红利 over a longer time horizon: the migration of global settlement demand, the institutionalization process of compliant stablecoins, and the "quasi-infrastructure attributes" once network products are established.

It is undeniable that for a long time to come, Circle may find it difficult to defeat Tether, but similarly, new competitors will find it extremely difficult to replicate in a short time the compliance path, channel network, and institutional trust accumulation that Circle has already completed.